UK Strategic Defense Review Thoughts
Nov. 1st, 2010 09:44 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
davidgillon Just for a change from my usual focus, some thoughts on the newly announced UK Strategic Defence Review. I spent 20-odd years working in the defence industry, so it is an area I have fairly extensive knowledge in. I haven't been through the full document as yet, I probably will in the near future, but for the moment this is working solely from the press reports.
A lot of opposition to the cuts (and have no doubt, they are cuts) will likely come from people who just think that cuts to the military are a bad idea (particularly in time of war), which is a perfectly valid opinion, but the military does not exist in a vacuum, it is an arm of the state and it is no good having a strong military if it comes at the cost of a broken economy. The problem here is that the UK Treasury has a well established history of ignoring strategic necessities and limiting defence spending in such a way as to try and force the armed forces to conduct their missions with less than the necessary resources. So do the cuts actually make sense? Answers are mixed....
British Army
Army out of Germany by 2020
With NATO now extending to the Russian/Belarusian/Ukrainian border, the strategic need for BAOR is fairly minimal, even Germany, the country BAOR is deployed to defend, is in the midst of substantial cuts to the Bundeswehr. Russia could potentially regenerate itself as a land-based threat, but that would take a considerable period of years and current generation Russian forces are clearly technologically outmatched by those of the West.
The problem with redeployment to the UK is the need (and cost) to provide barracks and dependent housing for the relocated troops, and particularly difficult in the crowded UK, to provide adequate training areas to replace those lost in Germany.
Personnel numbers to drop by 7,000 to 95,500
This I'm uncomfortable with. 7,000 men is around a brigade of troops. Iraq and Afganistan has stretched the Army, even though we've never deployed more than a reinforced brigade to each since the inital combat phase of Operation Telic. My personal opinion is that there is a strong case to be made for increasing Army strength to provide at least one extra light-role infantry brigade to reduce the over-stretch on the forces.
Challenger 2 tanks cut by 40% and AS-90 SPGs by 35%.
This is probably sustainable, the current need for extensive heavy armoured units is fairly low, Challenger and AS90 were built to oppose the Warsaw Pact juggernaught, which melted away in 1990. Medium-weight and light forces are better suited to expeditionary roles and in recent years the armoured regiments have left their Challengers in barracks while they operate wheeled AFVs such as Wolfhound in Iraq.
But does cutting 40% of CR2s mean cutting 40% of the armoured regiments? The tanks and SPGs may not be being used, but their crew are, someone has to man the medium-weight FRES-SV when it comes into service, otherwise our expeditionary forces will find themselves outgunned by any 3rd rate power. And does cutting them mean mothballing them against future need, or selling them?
Unaddressed
Whether the FRES programme of medium weight combat vehicles will now be anything like as extensive as planned.
Royal Air Force
Personnel reduced by 5,000 to 33,000
This is only sustainable if the rotation of units into expeditionary deployments means RAF manpower is not overstretched, and that is questionable.
Nimrod MRA4 to be Scrapped, RAF Kinloss to close
It doesn't matter if Nimrod MRA4 is £984 million over-budget, the budget overspend has happened and development is complete, the aircraft is almost ready to enter service. Scrapping Nimrod means scrapping the UK's maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capability, and last time I checked we were still a maritime rather than a continental power. Worse, those states we might find ourselves in a maritime confrontation with, either individually or as part of a coalition (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Argentina) are all either increasing their submarine forces or discussing it. Historically the RAF has been best in the world at maritime surveillance and ASW, but once a capability is gone it is gone and regenerating it is a process which will take years if not decades. If, a few years down the road, we find ourselves having to buy P-8 Poseidons from the US then developing the expertise to operate them will not be easy.
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft and Airbus A400M Procurement to go Ahead.
We really have no alternative around procuring the FSTA, though the Private Finance Initiative funding mechanism is as questionable as it has always been. A400M has had as many development and budget problems as Nimrod, but we have a choice of maintaining either A400M or C-130 as our tactical transport fleet and A400M is ultimately the more capable aircraft. The C-130J fleet is still fairly new, if being used hard, so hopefully there will be buyers.
Chinook buy cut to 12 from 22
The Support Helicopter Force has been an underfunded disgrace for a decade, the Chinook buy was supposed to regenerate it, recognising the need for increased helicopter lift shown in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Support Helicopter Force will still be better than it was, but not as good as it might have been (and my personal opinion remains that a mixed buy of Chinook and Merlin would have been considerably more versatile).
Harrier GR9 to be withdrawn in 2011
Harrier had to go eventually, its replacement is on its way and the end was visibly in sight, but withdrawing Harrier almost immediately leaves the current set of RN carriers without any fixed-wing aircraft whatsoever, which is a questionable decision on which more later. We can survive with Tornado GR4 as our strike element until F-35 comes into service, but we are losing our STOVL capability and it will not be replaced.
Typhoon and F-35C based Future Fast Jet Fleet
This has been the ultimate target for the past decade. Typhoon is essential in the air superiority role, F-35 is a bomb-truck to replace Harrier and Tornado, the controversial element is the switch from the expected STOVL F-35Bs to the CTOL F-35Cs. There is no doubt that F-35C is the more capable version once in the air, and cheaper to procure, the question is the loss of basing flexibility from giving up the STOVL capability we've had ever since Harrier was introduced. The ultimate answer is that most air forces have managed very well without it, the only exceptions being those naval air arms flying off STOVL-only carriers, and fortunately the new RN carriers have been developed to be CTOL-capable if necessary. Worryingly there are suggestions the 72 aircraft needed to serve as the airgroups on the CVFs may actually end up as a mere 12 aircraft (discussed further under RN).
One question that does need to be answered. Why on earth the MoD placed a $13m contract with Lockheed-Martin within the last few days for developing an F-35B rolling landing capability that is completely inapplicable to the F-35Cs we will now be buying? Did the right hand not know what the left was doing?
Sentinel R1 to be retired after Afghanistan
The Sentinel R1s (formerly ASTOR) have barely entered service, they have a radar-based ground surveillance capability that is applicable to any future conflict of whatever kind. This is a one of a kind capability, there is nothing else in the RAF fleet that carries out this mission. Like the Nimrod this is cutting a mission for the monetary saving, not because the mission has gone away. Without the Sentinels to spot approaching forces our own forces will be more exposed.
Unaddressed
The future of the RAF's UAV fleet and the Scavenger requirement. The procurement of 3 US RC-135V/W spy planes with antique airframes that will have to be converted from KC-135 tankers the US is urgently seeking to retire.
Royal Navy
Future of the Future Carrier
Not covered extensively in the general press, but discussed in the defence press, the two CVFs, Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales, are unlikely to be operational before 2020, one may be mothballed immediately on completion or even sold, and their standard air wing may consist of only 12 F-35Cs, casting doubt over the total number that will be purchased. Instead of two carriers with 36 strike aircraft each we will have one with 12. Apparently the intention is to be able to surge the air group to 36 in times of tension, which suggests a sad lack of knowledge on someone's part as to the need and difficulty in getting and keeping pilots carrier qualified before they can operate from a carrier. If Queen Elizabeth is on the far side of the world responding to some emergency and Prince of Wales in mothballs, then where exactly do the extra 24 aircraft do their carquals? (I suspect the MoD know exactly what the situation is, but have extricated the best deal they can from under the politico-Treasury axe)
Ark Royal to Decommission Immediately
The RN initially had three Invincible class carriers, Invincible herself has been stripped of parts to keep the other two running and is effectively decommissioned, Ark Royal is now to join her with Illustrious either to rerole as a helicopter carrier or also decommission. With Joint Force Harrier standing down there would in any case be no fixed wing aircraft to fly off either of them. Of course you have to question exactly what message this sends to Argentina (fortunately there is a tripwire flight of 4 Typhoons at RAF Mount Pleasant to make them think twice). However you look at it, the UK is out of the aircraft carrier business until HMS Queen Elizabeth is operational.
HMS Ocean or HMS Illustrious to be decommissioned
Apparently the decision will be based on which is more capable of remaining in service as a helicopter carrier -- I had hoped that was the sort of question the RN would know the answer to automatically and not need to think about....
1 Bay Class Landing Ship to decommission
The RN has a very capable amphibious force, I'm rather surprised it came out of the SDR with only this one loss.
SSBN replacement delayed four years
The Vanguards can probably run on this long, whether Trident can is more of a question, and ultimately one for which we depend on the US. The real issue is whether the huge cost of the replacement SSBNs is going to be moved into the regular defence budget, which could potentially devastate future defence procurement if the Treasury refuses to recognise it as a specific and vital non-recurring cost and insists on a consistent year on year defence budget. The reduction of the Trident force to 10 missiles/40 warheads per SSBN is a reasonable one given a full nuclear war scenario is unlikely.
Astute Programme to remain at 7
This seems sensible, the Astute build is well underway and even 7 boats represents a substantial reduction from the previous SSN force. This is particularly so if no replacement for the Trafalgar class is in the offing for when they eventually retire (a point I've not seen discussed).
Surface Combatant Force Reduced to 19
This is very tight. Assuming the frequently suggested ratio of 33% of the force in refit or otherwise unavailable at any one time that means a deployable force of only 11 ships. Put one guardship in the Caribbean and another in the Gulf and that's only 9 ships to escort the carriers and the amphibious force. If we ever have both carriers operational, which is increasingly unlikely, then there aren't sufficient escorts to go around, with one operational it is marginal. The Type 42 class was already in the process of rapidly decommissioning as the Type 45s replace them, and there was already going to be a temporary shortfall in the RN's area anti-air warface capability (though an ultimate increase as Type 45 is much more capable), which will not be helped by the premature retirement of the 4 Type 22 Batch 3 frigates, which had been intended to run on until 2019.
Type 23 to be Replaced by Type 26 after 2020
This is essential, and any cuts in numbers here are not sustainable. The original plan was to replace Type 22 and Type 23 (and two cancelled Type 45s) with 10 ASW specialised Future Surface Combatant (FSC) C1s and 8 general purpose FSC C2s. Now the RN will receive only 13 ships of a single general purpose class, the Type 26.
RN Manpower reduced to 30,000
RN strength is fairly closely linked to the ships in the fleet, but there really isn't a lot to spare here.
Unaddressed
Left unstated is whether there will be a replacement for the Trafalgar class SSNs and what will become of the Future Mine Countermeasures/Hydrographic/Patrol Vessel (ex FSC C3), intended to replace the mine-warfare, offshore patrol fleet and survey fleet . Equally unstated is how serious the RN is about retaining a helicopter ASW capability with the Sea King/Merlin fleet, which is suffering under the need to have transport helicopters in Afghanistan.
Conclusions
Some of these concerns are hopefully addressed in the full document, and this is much better than many people had feared (much as it goes against the grain to praise a member of the government the Minister of Defence appears to have fought his corner well). but there is definite cause for concern at the cutting of entire missions and some of what remains is flimsier than it should be, the CVFs and their air group in particular.
A lot of opposition to the cuts (and have no doubt, they are cuts) will likely come from people who just think that cuts to the military are a bad idea (particularly in time of war), which is a perfectly valid opinion, but the military does not exist in a vacuum, it is an arm of the state and it is no good having a strong military if it comes at the cost of a broken economy. The problem here is that the UK Treasury has a well established history of ignoring strategic necessities and limiting defence spending in such a way as to try and force the armed forces to conduct their missions with less than the necessary resources. So do the cuts actually make sense? Answers are mixed....
British Army
Army out of Germany by 2020
With NATO now extending to the Russian/Belarusian/Ukrainian border, the strategic need for BAOR is fairly minimal, even Germany, the country BAOR is deployed to defend, is in the midst of substantial cuts to the Bundeswehr. Russia could potentially regenerate itself as a land-based threat, but that would take a considerable period of years and current generation Russian forces are clearly technologically outmatched by those of the West.
The problem with redeployment to the UK is the need (and cost) to provide barracks and dependent housing for the relocated troops, and particularly difficult in the crowded UK, to provide adequate training areas to replace those lost in Germany.
Personnel numbers to drop by 7,000 to 95,500
This I'm uncomfortable with. 7,000 men is around a brigade of troops. Iraq and Afganistan has stretched the Army, even though we've never deployed more than a reinforced brigade to each since the inital combat phase of Operation Telic. My personal opinion is that there is a strong case to be made for increasing Army strength to provide at least one extra light-role infantry brigade to reduce the over-stretch on the forces.
Challenger 2 tanks cut by 40% and AS-90 SPGs by 35%.
This is probably sustainable, the current need for extensive heavy armoured units is fairly low, Challenger and AS90 were built to oppose the Warsaw Pact juggernaught, which melted away in 1990. Medium-weight and light forces are better suited to expeditionary roles and in recent years the armoured regiments have left their Challengers in barracks while they operate wheeled AFVs such as Wolfhound in Iraq.
But does cutting 40% of CR2s mean cutting 40% of the armoured regiments? The tanks and SPGs may not be being used, but their crew are, someone has to man the medium-weight FRES-SV when it comes into service, otherwise our expeditionary forces will find themselves outgunned by any 3rd rate power. And does cutting them mean mothballing them against future need, or selling them?
Unaddressed
Whether the FRES programme of medium weight combat vehicles will now be anything like as extensive as planned.
Royal Air Force
Personnel reduced by 5,000 to 33,000
This is only sustainable if the rotation of units into expeditionary deployments means RAF manpower is not overstretched, and that is questionable.
Nimrod MRA4 to be Scrapped, RAF Kinloss to close
It doesn't matter if Nimrod MRA4 is £984 million over-budget, the budget overspend has happened and development is complete, the aircraft is almost ready to enter service. Scrapping Nimrod means scrapping the UK's maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capability, and last time I checked we were still a maritime rather than a continental power. Worse, those states we might find ourselves in a maritime confrontation with, either individually or as part of a coalition (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Argentina) are all either increasing their submarine forces or discussing it. Historically the RAF has been best in the world at maritime surveillance and ASW, but once a capability is gone it is gone and regenerating it is a process which will take years if not decades. If, a few years down the road, we find ourselves having to buy P-8 Poseidons from the US then developing the expertise to operate them will not be easy.
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft and Airbus A400M Procurement to go Ahead.
We really have no alternative around procuring the FSTA, though the Private Finance Initiative funding mechanism is as questionable as it has always been. A400M has had as many development and budget problems as Nimrod, but we have a choice of maintaining either A400M or C-130 as our tactical transport fleet and A400M is ultimately the more capable aircraft. The C-130J fleet is still fairly new, if being used hard, so hopefully there will be buyers.
Chinook buy cut to 12 from 22
The Support Helicopter Force has been an underfunded disgrace for a decade, the Chinook buy was supposed to regenerate it, recognising the need for increased helicopter lift shown in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Support Helicopter Force will still be better than it was, but not as good as it might have been (and my personal opinion remains that a mixed buy of Chinook and Merlin would have been considerably more versatile).
Harrier GR9 to be withdrawn in 2011
Harrier had to go eventually, its replacement is on its way and the end was visibly in sight, but withdrawing Harrier almost immediately leaves the current set of RN carriers without any fixed-wing aircraft whatsoever, which is a questionable decision on which more later. We can survive with Tornado GR4 as our strike element until F-35 comes into service, but we are losing our STOVL capability and it will not be replaced.
Typhoon and F-35C based Future Fast Jet Fleet
This has been the ultimate target for the past decade. Typhoon is essential in the air superiority role, F-35 is a bomb-truck to replace Harrier and Tornado, the controversial element is the switch from the expected STOVL F-35Bs to the CTOL F-35Cs. There is no doubt that F-35C is the more capable version once in the air, and cheaper to procure, the question is the loss of basing flexibility from giving up the STOVL capability we've had ever since Harrier was introduced. The ultimate answer is that most air forces have managed very well without it, the only exceptions being those naval air arms flying off STOVL-only carriers, and fortunately the new RN carriers have been developed to be CTOL-capable if necessary. Worryingly there are suggestions the 72 aircraft needed to serve as the airgroups on the CVFs may actually end up as a mere 12 aircraft (discussed further under RN).
One question that does need to be answered. Why on earth the MoD placed a $13m contract with Lockheed-Martin within the last few days for developing an F-35B rolling landing capability that is completely inapplicable to the F-35Cs we will now be buying? Did the right hand not know what the left was doing?
Sentinel R1 to be retired after Afghanistan
The Sentinel R1s (formerly ASTOR) have barely entered service, they have a radar-based ground surveillance capability that is applicable to any future conflict of whatever kind. This is a one of a kind capability, there is nothing else in the RAF fleet that carries out this mission. Like the Nimrod this is cutting a mission for the monetary saving, not because the mission has gone away. Without the Sentinels to spot approaching forces our own forces will be more exposed.
Unaddressed
The future of the RAF's UAV fleet and the Scavenger requirement. The procurement of 3 US RC-135V/W spy planes with antique airframes that will have to be converted from KC-135 tankers the US is urgently seeking to retire.
Royal Navy
Future of the Future Carrier
Not covered extensively in the general press, but discussed in the defence press, the two CVFs, Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales, are unlikely to be operational before 2020, one may be mothballed immediately on completion or even sold, and their standard air wing may consist of only 12 F-35Cs, casting doubt over the total number that will be purchased. Instead of two carriers with 36 strike aircraft each we will have one with 12. Apparently the intention is to be able to surge the air group to 36 in times of tension, which suggests a sad lack of knowledge on someone's part as to the need and difficulty in getting and keeping pilots carrier qualified before they can operate from a carrier. If Queen Elizabeth is on the far side of the world responding to some emergency and Prince of Wales in mothballs, then where exactly do the extra 24 aircraft do their carquals? (I suspect the MoD know exactly what the situation is, but have extricated the best deal they can from under the politico-Treasury axe)
Ark Royal to Decommission Immediately
The RN initially had three Invincible class carriers, Invincible herself has been stripped of parts to keep the other two running and is effectively decommissioned, Ark Royal is now to join her with Illustrious either to rerole as a helicopter carrier or also decommission. With Joint Force Harrier standing down there would in any case be no fixed wing aircraft to fly off either of them. Of course you have to question exactly what message this sends to Argentina (fortunately there is a tripwire flight of 4 Typhoons at RAF Mount Pleasant to make them think twice). However you look at it, the UK is out of the aircraft carrier business until HMS Queen Elizabeth is operational.
HMS Ocean or HMS Illustrious to be decommissioned
Apparently the decision will be based on which is more capable of remaining in service as a helicopter carrier -- I had hoped that was the sort of question the RN would know the answer to automatically and not need to think about....
1 Bay Class Landing Ship to decommission
The RN has a very capable amphibious force, I'm rather surprised it came out of the SDR with only this one loss.
SSBN replacement delayed four years
The Vanguards can probably run on this long, whether Trident can is more of a question, and ultimately one for which we depend on the US. The real issue is whether the huge cost of the replacement SSBNs is going to be moved into the regular defence budget, which could potentially devastate future defence procurement if the Treasury refuses to recognise it as a specific and vital non-recurring cost and insists on a consistent year on year defence budget. The reduction of the Trident force to 10 missiles/40 warheads per SSBN is a reasonable one given a full nuclear war scenario is unlikely.
Astute Programme to remain at 7
This seems sensible, the Astute build is well underway and even 7 boats represents a substantial reduction from the previous SSN force. This is particularly so if no replacement for the Trafalgar class is in the offing for when they eventually retire (a point I've not seen discussed).
Surface Combatant Force Reduced to 19
This is very tight. Assuming the frequently suggested ratio of 33% of the force in refit or otherwise unavailable at any one time that means a deployable force of only 11 ships. Put one guardship in the Caribbean and another in the Gulf and that's only 9 ships to escort the carriers and the amphibious force. If we ever have both carriers operational, which is increasingly unlikely, then there aren't sufficient escorts to go around, with one operational it is marginal. The Type 42 class was already in the process of rapidly decommissioning as the Type 45s replace them, and there was already going to be a temporary shortfall in the RN's area anti-air warface capability (though an ultimate increase as Type 45 is much more capable), which will not be helped by the premature retirement of the 4 Type 22 Batch 3 frigates, which had been intended to run on until 2019.
Type 23 to be Replaced by Type 26 after 2020
This is essential, and any cuts in numbers here are not sustainable. The original plan was to replace Type 22 and Type 23 (and two cancelled Type 45s) with 10 ASW specialised Future Surface Combatant (FSC) C1s and 8 general purpose FSC C2s. Now the RN will receive only 13 ships of a single general purpose class, the Type 26.
RN Manpower reduced to 30,000
RN strength is fairly closely linked to the ships in the fleet, but there really isn't a lot to spare here.
Unaddressed
Left unstated is whether there will be a replacement for the Trafalgar class SSNs and what will become of the Future Mine Countermeasures/Hydrographic/Patrol Vessel (ex FSC C3), intended to replace the mine-warfare, offshore patrol fleet and survey fleet . Equally unstated is how serious the RN is about retaining a helicopter ASW capability with the Sea King/Merlin fleet, which is suffering under the need to have transport helicopters in Afghanistan.
Conclusions
Some of these concerns are hopefully addressed in the full document, and this is much better than many people had feared (much as it goes against the grain to praise a member of the government the Minister of Defence appears to have fought his corner well). but there is definite cause for concern at the cutting of entire missions and some of what remains is flimsier than it should be, the CVFs and their air group in particular.
![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
no subject
Date: 2011-02-16 02:48 pm (UTC)